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Philosophy & Religious Studies

LSD Increases Primary Process Thinking via Serotonin 2A Receptor Activation

November 8, 2017 / LSD, Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Publications / By / , , , , , ,

Abstract

Rationale: Stimulation of serotonin 2A (5-HT2A) receptors by lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and related compounds such as psilocybin has previously been shown to increase primary process thinking – an ontologically and evolutionary early, implicit, associative, and automatic mode of thinking which is typically occurring during altered states of consciousness such as dreaming. However, it is still largely unknown whether LSD induces primary process thinking under placebo-controlled, standardized experimental conditions and whether these effects are related to subjective experience and 5-HT2A receptor activation. Therefore, this study aimed to test the hypotheses that LSD increases primary process thinking and that primary process thinking depends on 5-HT2A receptor activation and is related to subjective drug effects.

Methods: Twenty-five healthy subjects performed an audio-recorded mental imagery task 7 h after drug administration during three drug conditions: placebo, LSD (100 mcg orally) and LSD together with the 5-HT2A receptor antagonist ketanserin (40 mg orally). The main outcome variable in this study was primary index (PI), a formal measure of primary process thinking in the imagery reports. State of consciousness was evaluated using the Altered State of Consciousness (5D-ASC) rating scale.

Results: LSD, compared with placebo, significantly increased primary index (p < 0.001, Bonferroni-corrected). The LSD-induced increase in primary index was positively correlated with LSD-induced disembodiment (p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected), and blissful state (p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected) on the 5D-ASC. Both LSD-induced increases in primary index and changes in state of consciousness were fully blocked by ketanserin.

Conclusion: LSD induces primary process thinking via activation of 5-HT2A receptors and in relation to disembodiment and blissful state. Primary process thinking appears to crucially organize inner experiences during both dreams and psychedelic states of consciousness.

Kraehenmann, R., Pokorny, D., Aicher, H., Preller, K. H., Pokorny, T., Bosch, O. G., … & Vollenweider, F. X. (2017). LSD Increases Primary Process Thinking via Serotonin 2A Receptor Activation. Frontiers in Pharmacology, 8, 814. 10.3389/fphar.2017.00814
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Psychedelic pleasures: An affective understanding of the joys of tripping

September 13, 2017 / LSD, Mushrooms / Psilocybin, Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Psychology, Publications / By /

Abstract

BACKGROUND:
This paper considers the pleasures of psychedelic drugs and proposes a Deleuzian understanding of drugged pleasures as affects. In spite of a large body of work on psychedelics, not least on their therapeutic potentials, the literature is almost completely devoid of discussions of the recreational practices and pleasures of entheogenic drugs. Yet, most people do not use psychedelics because of their curative powers, but because they are fun and enjoyable ways to alter the experience of reality.
METHODS:
In the analytical part of the paper, I examine 100 trip reports from an internet forum in order to explore the pleasures of tripping.
RESULTS:
The analyses map out how drugs such as LSD and mushrooms – in combination with contextual factors such as other people, music and nature – give rise to a set of affective modifications of the drug user’s capacities to feel, sense and act.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion it is argued that taking seriously the large group of recreational users of hallucinogens is important not only because it broadens our understanding of how entheogenic drugs work in different bodies and settings, but also because it may enable a more productive and harm reductive transmission of knowledge between the scientific and recreational psychedelic communities.
Bøhling, F. (2017). Psychedelic pleasures: An affective understanding of the joys of tripping. International Journal of Drug Policy, 49, 133-143. 10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.07.017
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Psychedelic pleasures: An affective understanding of the joys of tripping

September 13, 2017 / Anthropology & Sociology, LSD, Mushrooms / Psilocybin, Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Psychology, Publications / By /

Abstract

BACKGROUND:
This paper considers the pleasures of psychedelic drugs and proposes a Deleuzian understanding of drugged pleasures as affects. In spite of a large body of work on psychedelics, not least on their therapeutic potentials, the literature is almost completely devoid of discussions of the recreational practices and pleasures of entheogenic drugs. Yet, most people do not use psychedelics because of their curative powers, but because they are fun and enjoyable ways to alter the experience of reality.
METHODS:
In the analytical part of the paper, I examine 100 trip reports from an internet forum in order to explore the pleasures of tripping.
RESULTS:
The analyses map out how drugs such as LSD and mushrooms – in combination with contextual factors such as other people, music and nature – give rise to a set of affective modifications of the drug user’s capacities to feel, sense and act.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion it is argued that taking seriously the large group of recreational users of hallucinogens is important not only because it broadens our understanding of how entheogenic drugs work in different bodies and settings, but also because it may enable a more productive and harm reductive transmission of knowledge between the scientific and recreational psychedelic communities.
Bøhling, F. (2017). Psychedelic pleasures: An affective understanding of the joys of tripping. International Journal of Drug Policy, 49, 133-143. 10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.07.017
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Entheogenesis: Toward an Expanded Worldview for Our Time

August 9, 2017 / Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Psychology / By /

Abstract

Whereas the terminology of psychedelics has acquired spurious cultural associations of “tripping,” the historically primal concept of consciousness expansion has two advantages. One, it connects psychedelic drugs with other modes of consciousness expansion, such as meditation and creative visioning; and two, it suggests contrasting comparison with the consciousness contraction involved in concentration and focus. Both expansions and contractions can be observed at the level of an individual’s states of consciousness and also at the level of the shared worldview of society. Contemporary world culture is moving toward an expanded worldview that recognizes both the material and the spiritual dimensions of our existence.
Metzner, R. (2017). Entheogenesis: Toward an Expanded Worldview for Our Time. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 57(5), 443-449. 10.1177/0022167817723405
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The hyperassociative mind: The psychedelic experience and Merleau-Ponty’s “wild being”

July 20, 2017 / Mescaline / Cacti, Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies / By / , , , ,

Abstract

Purpose

In contemporary phenomenology, Dieter Lohmar has suggested that the new task of phenomenological research is to analyze the “alternative representational systems” of fantasy. In line with this program, we propose that psychedelic experience could also be suitable subject to this project subsumed under the wider category of fantasy activity. The aim of this paper is to show that psychedelic experiences offer a favorable situation to study the imagination.

Method

The paper applies the conceptual framework of the late Merleau-Ponty, developed in The Visible and the Invisible, using his mescaline analyses which have been elaborated in The Phenomenology of Perception.

Results

We demonstrate that psychedelic visions and emotional states can be discussed within the Merleau-Pontian framework of “wild world.” From the viewpoint of phenomenology, we suggest that psychedelic visions represent an ongoing sense-making and Gestalt-formation process in which the role of the elaborative activity of the subject is crucial. These – often unsettling – visions show the basic volatility and ambiguity of perception and fantasy, which also sheds light to the hidden schemes of perception, thinking, and emotion of normal consciousness.

Conclusions

Freud claimed that dreams are “the royal road” to the unconscious. In an analogous manner, while dreams were the primary psychoscope to the unconscious of psychoanalysis, in contemporary phenomenology psychedelic experiences may show a possible way to an another kind of unconscious, the phenomenological unconscious. This unconscious comprises the hidden schemes and basic affective emotional attitudes of the knowing subject.

Szummer, C., Horváth, L., SzabÓ, A., Frecska, E., & OrzÓi, K. (2017). The hyperassociative mind: The psychedelic experience and Merleau-Ponty’s “wild being”. Journal of Psychedelic Studies, (0), 1-10. 10.1556/2054.01.2017.006
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Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience

June 30, 2017 / LSD, Mushrooms / Psilocybin, Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Psychology, Publications / By / ,

Abstract

Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. Combining recent work on the ‘integrative self’ and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist.
Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 3(1). 10.1093/nc/nix016
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Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

May 23, 2017 / LSD, Mushrooms / Psilocybin, Neuroscience, Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Psychology, Publications / By /

Abstract

There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid receptor (KOR). While these substances act on different neurotransmitter receptors, they all produce strong subjective effects that can be compared to the symptoms of acute psychosis, including ego dissolution. It has been suggested that neuroimaging of DIED can indirectly shed light on the neural correlates of the self. While this line of inquiry is promising, its results must be interpreted with caution. First, neural correlates of ego dissolution might reveal the necessary neurophysiological conditions for the maintenance of the sense of self, but it is more doubtful that this method can reveal its minimally sufficient conditions. Second, it is necessary to define the relevant notion of self at play in the phenomenon of DIED. This article suggests that DIED consists in the disruption of subpersonal processes underlying the “minimal” or “embodied” self, i.e., the basic experience of being a self rooted in multimodal integration of self-related stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with Bayesian models of phenomenal selfhood, according to which the subjective structure of conscious experience ultimately results from the optimization of predictions in perception and action. Finally, it is argued that DIED is also of particular interest for philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it challenges theories according to which consciousness always involves self-awareness. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary conscious experience might involve a minimal kind of self-awareness rooted in multisensory processing, which is what appears to fade away during DIED.
Millière, R. (2017). Looking For The Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 11. 10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245
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MDMA does not alter responses to the Trier Social Stress Test in humans

April 21, 2017 / MDMA, Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies / By / , ,

Abstract

Rationale

±3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, “ecstasy”) is a stimulant-psychedelic drug with unique social effects. It may dampen reactivity to negative social stimuli such as social threat and rejection. Perhaps because of these effects, MDMA has shown promise as a treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, the effect of single doses of MDMA on responses to an acute psychosocial stressor has not been tested.

Objectives

In this study, we sought to test the effects of MDMA on responses to stress in healthy adults using a public speaking task. We hypothesized that the drug would reduce responses to the stressful task.

Methods

Volunteers (N = 39) were randomly assigned to receive placebo (N = 13), 0.5 mg/kg MDMA (N = 13), or 1.0 mg/kg MDMA (N = 13) during a stress and a no-stress session. Dependent measures included subjective reports of drug effects and emotional responses to the task, as well as salivary cortisol, heart rate, and blood pressure.

Results

The stress task produced its expected increase in physiological responses (cortisol, heart rate) and subjective ratings of stress in all three groups, and MDMA produced its expected subjective and physiological effects. MDMA alone increased ratings of subjective stress, heart rate, and saliva cortisol concentrations, but contrary to our hypothesis, it did not moderate responses to the Trier Social Stress Test.

Conclusions

Despite its efficacy in PTSD and anxiety, MDMA did not reduce either the subjective or objective responses to stress in this controlled study. The conditions under which MDMA relieves responses to negative events or memories remain to be determined.

Bershad, A. K., Miller, M. A., & de Wit, H. (2017). MDMA does not alter responses to the Trier Social Stress Test in humans. Psychopharmacology, 1-8. 10.1007/s00213-017-4621-x
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Limitations to ‘Psychedelics and the science of self experience’

March 30, 2017 / Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Psychology / By / , ,

Abstract

We read Matthew Nour and Robin Carhart-Harris editorial with enthusiasm. The Section History Ethics & Philosophy of Psychiatry Queensland meets once a month in the Brisbane area. The writers of this eLetter met at the end of March 2017and discussed this editorial. We congratulate and we agree with Derek K Tracy in “highlights of this issue” that it is a mesmerising read. We found that the editorial is well composed, interesting in its logic and we notice the structure to the editorial. There are 6 separate headings: defining the self, self in neuroscience, self disturbance , psychedelics as a window into the self, therapeutic implications, and conclusions. We discussed that overall the paper only presents a reductionist, non-compatabilist, materialist theory of self, which becomes a fallacy of a circular argument. For the purpose of this editorial such a reduction of a complex philosophical area is indeed suitable, but ignores other models and we miss a paragraph on these limitations. We feel that it would have assisted if there had been frank comments on the reductionist approach and the diverse facets to self relevant to psychiatry.
The quantitative meta analysis locates self experience to default mode network in a cortical median and anterior cingulate brain anatomy. Other theories of the self in the light of memories and emotions for example, made us curious about FMRI findings in the amygdala and hippocampal areas. However acknowledging FMRI as “correlation”, the subtext is identity with the subject of the correlation.
We were reminded that after all the self is a very complex philosophical area that preoccupied many eminent thinkers in the past (Remes P& Sihvola) We believe that also a discussion of other pathologies of self, multiple selves associated with dissociation and multiple personality disorder would have been more inclusive. We were curious about the role of language especially in people who speak several languages as the narrative (McAdams) of the self is based on semantics.
We believe that a paragraph highlighting the limitations to the approach would have made this a more balanced editorial. Also referencing evidence on psychedelics and clinical experience of their use, references that highlight a number of the risks and side effects (Larsen JK and Johnson M et al) would have added . There are merits in to including that psychedelics are also a potential double edged sword.
Beckmann, K. M., Brennan, R., & Arnold, J. (2017). Limitations to’Psychedelics and the science of self experience’.
Link to full text

Limitations to 'Psychedelics and the science of self experience'

March 30, 2017 / Papers, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Psychology / By / , ,

Abstract

We read Matthew Nour and Robin Carhart-Harris editorial with enthusiasm. The Section History Ethics & Philosophy of Psychiatry Queensland meets once a month in the Brisbane area. The writers of this eLetter met at the end of March 2017and discussed this editorial. We congratulate and we agree with Derek K Tracy in “highlights of this issue” that it is a mesmerising read. We found that the editorial is well composed, interesting in its logic and we notice the structure to the editorial. There are 6 separate headings: defining the self, self in neuroscience, self disturbance , psychedelics as a window into the self, therapeutic implications, and conclusions. We discussed that overall the paper only presents a reductionist, non-compatabilist, materialist theory of self, which becomes a fallacy of a circular argument. For the purpose of this editorial such a reduction of a complex philosophical area is indeed suitable, but ignores other models and we miss a paragraph on these limitations. We feel that it would have assisted if there had been frank comments on the reductionist approach and the diverse facets to self relevant to psychiatry.
The quantitative meta analysis locates self experience to default mode network in a cortical median and anterior cingulate brain anatomy. Other theories of the self in the light of memories and emotions for example, made us curious about FMRI findings in the amygdala and hippocampal areas. However acknowledging FMRI as “correlation”, the subtext is identity with the subject of the correlation.
We were reminded that after all the self is a very complex philosophical area that preoccupied many eminent thinkers in the past (Remes P& Sihvola) We believe that also a discussion of other pathologies of self, multiple selves associated with dissociation and multiple personality disorder would have been more inclusive. We were curious about the role of language especially in people who speak several languages as the narrative (McAdams) of the self is based on semantics.
We believe that a paragraph highlighting the limitations to the approach would have made this a more balanced editorial. Also referencing evidence on psychedelics and clinical experience of their use, references that highlight a number of the risks and side effects (Larsen JK and Johnson M et al) would have added . There are merits in to including that psychedelics are also a potential double edged sword.
Beckmann, K. M., Brennan, R., & Arnold, J. (2017). Limitations to’Psychedelics and the science of self experience’.
Link to full text

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