OPEN Foundation

Philosophy

The hyperassociative mind: The psychedelic experience and Merleau-Ponty’s “wild being”

Abstract

Purpose

In contemporary phenomenology, Dieter Lohmar has suggested that the new task of phenomenological research is to analyze the “alternative representational systems” of fantasy. In line with this program, we propose that psychedelic experience could also be suitable subject to this project subsumed under the wider category of fantasy activity. The aim of this paper is to show that psychedelic experiences offer a favorable situation to study the imagination.

Method

The paper applies the conceptual framework of the late Merleau-Ponty, developed in The Visible and the Invisible, using his mescaline analyses which have been elaborated in The Phenomenology of Perception.

Results

We demonstrate that psychedelic visions and emotional states can be discussed within the Merleau-Pontian framework of “wild world.” From the viewpoint of phenomenology, we suggest that psychedelic visions represent an ongoing sense-making and Gestalt-formation process in which the role of the elaborative activity of the subject is crucial. These – often unsettling – visions show the basic volatility and ambiguity of perception and fantasy, which also sheds light to the hidden schemes of perception, thinking, and emotion of normal consciousness.

Conclusions

Freud claimed that dreams are “the royal road” to the unconscious. In an analogous manner, while dreams were the primary psychoscope to the unconscious of psychoanalysis, in contemporary phenomenology psychedelic experiences may show a possible way to an another kind of unconscious, the phenomenological unconscious. This unconscious comprises the hidden schemes and basic affective emotional attitudes of the knowing subject.

Szummer, C., Horváth, L., SzabÓ, A., Frecska, E., & OrzÓi, K. (2017). The hyperassociative mind: The psychedelic experience and Merleau-Ponty’s “wild being”. Journal of Psychedelic Studies, (0), 1-10. 10.1556/2054.01.2017.006
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Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience

Abstract

Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. Combining recent work on the ‘integrative self’ and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist.
Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness3(1). 10.1093/nc/nix016
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Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

Abstract

There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid receptor (KOR). While these substances act on different neurotransmitter receptors, they all produce strong subjective effects that can be compared to the symptoms of acute psychosis, including ego dissolution. It has been suggested that neuroimaging of DIED can indirectly shed light on the neural correlates of the self. While this line of inquiry is promising, its results must be interpreted with caution. First, neural correlates of ego dissolution might reveal the necessary neurophysiological conditions for the maintenance of the sense of self, but it is more doubtful that this method can reveal its minimally sufficient conditions. Second, it is necessary to define the relevant notion of self at play in the phenomenon of DIED. This article suggests that DIED consists in the disruption of subpersonal processes underlying the “minimal” or “embodied” self, i.e., the basic experience of being a self rooted in multimodal integration of self-related stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with Bayesian models of phenomenal selfhood, according to which the subjective structure of conscious experience ultimately results from the optimization of predictions in perception and action. Finally, it is argued that DIED is also of particular interest for philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it challenges theories according to which consciousness always involves self-awareness. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary conscious experience might involve a minimal kind of self-awareness rooted in multisensory processing, which is what appears to fade away during DIED.
Millière, R. (2017). Looking For The Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 11. 10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245
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MDMA does not alter responses to the Trier Social Stress Test in humans

Abstract

Rationale

±3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, “ecstasy”) is a stimulant-psychedelic drug with unique social effects. It may dampen reactivity to negative social stimuli such as social threat and rejection. Perhaps because of these effects, MDMA has shown promise as a treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, the effect of single doses of MDMA on responses to an acute psychosocial stressor has not been tested.

Objectives

In this study, we sought to test the effects of MDMA on responses to stress in healthy adults using a public speaking task. We hypothesized that the drug would reduce responses to the stressful task.

Methods

Volunteers (N = 39) were randomly assigned to receive placebo (N = 13), 0.5 mg/kg MDMA (N = 13), or 1.0 mg/kg MDMA (N = 13) during a stress and a no-stress session. Dependent measures included subjective reports of drug effects and emotional responses to the task, as well as salivary cortisol, heart rate, and blood pressure.

Results

The stress task produced its expected increase in physiological responses (cortisol, heart rate) and subjective ratings of stress in all three groups, and MDMA produced its expected subjective and physiological effects. MDMA alone increased ratings of subjective stress, heart rate, and saliva cortisol concentrations, but contrary to our hypothesis, it did not moderate responses to the Trier Social Stress Test.

Conclusions

Despite its efficacy in PTSD and anxiety, MDMA did not reduce either the subjective or objective responses to stress in this controlled study. The conditions under which MDMA relieves responses to negative events or memories remain to be determined.

Bershad, A. K., Miller, M. A., & de Wit, H. (2017). MDMA does not alter responses to the Trier Social Stress Test in humans. Psychopharmacology, 1-8. 10.1007/s00213-017-4621-x
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Limitations to ‘Psychedelics and the science of self experience’

Abstract

We read Matthew Nour and Robin Carhart-Harris editorial with enthusiasm. The Section History Ethics & Philosophy of Psychiatry Queensland meets once a month in the Brisbane area. The writers of this eLetter met at the end of March 2017and discussed this editorial. We congratulate and we agree with Derek K Tracy in “highlights of this issue” that it is a mesmerising read. We found that the editorial is well composed, interesting in its logic and we notice the structure to the editorial. There are 6 separate headings: defining the self, self in neuroscience, self disturbance , psychedelics as a window into the self, therapeutic implications, and conclusions. We discussed that overall the paper only presents a reductionist, non-compatabilist, materialist theory of self, which becomes a fallacy of a circular argument. For the purpose of this editorial such a reduction of a complex philosophical area is indeed suitable, but ignores other models and we miss a paragraph on these limitations. We feel that it would have assisted if there had been frank comments on the reductionist approach and the diverse facets to self relevant to psychiatry.
The quantitative meta analysis locates self experience to default mode network in a cortical median and anterior cingulate brain anatomy. Other theories of the self in the light of memories and emotions for example, made us curious about FMRI findings in the amygdala and hippocampal areas. However acknowledging FMRI as “correlation”, the subtext is identity with the subject of the correlation.
We were reminded that after all the self is a very complex philosophical area that preoccupied many eminent thinkers in the past (Remes P& Sihvola) We believe that also a discussion of other pathologies of self, multiple selves associated with dissociation and multiple personality disorder would have been more inclusive. We were curious about the role of language especially in people who speak several languages as the narrative (McAdams) of the self is based on semantics.
We believe that a paragraph highlighting the limitations to the approach would have made this a more balanced editorial. Also referencing evidence on psychedelics and clinical experience of their use, references that highlight a number of the risks and side effects (Larsen JK and Johnson M et al) would have added . There are merits in to including that psychedelics are also a potential double edged sword.
Beckmann, K. M., Brennan, R., & Arnold, J. (2017). Limitations to’Psychedelics and the science of self experience’.
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Limitations to 'Psychedelics and the science of self experience'

Abstract

We read Matthew Nour and Robin Carhart-Harris editorial with enthusiasm. The Section History Ethics & Philosophy of Psychiatry Queensland meets once a month in the Brisbane area. The writers of this eLetter met at the end of March 2017and discussed this editorial. We congratulate and we agree with Derek K Tracy in “highlights of this issue” that it is a mesmerising read. We found that the editorial is well composed, interesting in its logic and we notice the structure to the editorial. There are 6 separate headings: defining the self, self in neuroscience, self disturbance , psychedelics as a window into the self, therapeutic implications, and conclusions. We discussed that overall the paper only presents a reductionist, non-compatabilist, materialist theory of self, which becomes a fallacy of a circular argument. For the purpose of this editorial such a reduction of a complex philosophical area is indeed suitable, but ignores other models and we miss a paragraph on these limitations. We feel that it would have assisted if there had been frank comments on the reductionist approach and the diverse facets to self relevant to psychiatry.
The quantitative meta analysis locates self experience to default mode network in a cortical median and anterior cingulate brain anatomy. Other theories of the self in the light of memories and emotions for example, made us curious about FMRI findings in the amygdala and hippocampal areas. However acknowledging FMRI as “correlation”, the subtext is identity with the subject of the correlation.
We were reminded that after all the self is a very complex philosophical area that preoccupied many eminent thinkers in the past (Remes P& Sihvola) We believe that also a discussion of other pathologies of self, multiple selves associated with dissociation and multiple personality disorder would have been more inclusive. We were curious about the role of language especially in people who speak several languages as the narrative (McAdams) of the self is based on semantics.
We believe that a paragraph highlighting the limitations to the approach would have made this a more balanced editorial. Also referencing evidence on psychedelics and clinical experience of their use, references that highlight a number of the risks and side effects (Larsen JK and Johnson M et al) would have added . There are merits in to including that psychedelics are also a potential double edged sword.
Beckmann, K. M., Brennan, R., & Arnold, J. (2017). Limitations to’Psychedelics and the science of self experience’.
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Weak phantasy and visionary phantasy: the phenomenological significance of altered states of consciousness

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the definitional problems of altered states of consciousness and their potential relevance in phenomenological investigation. We suggest that visionary states or visionary phantasy working induced by psychedelics (VSs), as extraordinary types of altered states, are appropriate subjects for phenomenological analysis. Naturally, visionary states are not quite ordinary workings of the human mind, however certain cognitive psychological and evolutionary epistemological investigations show that they can give new insights into the nature of consciousness. Furthermore, we suggest that contemporary inquiries concerning altered states in consciousness studies give an opportunity to complete the contemporary phenomenological investigations of phantasy with the notion of visionary phantasy. Here we propose that the similarities and differences between Dieter Lohmar’s weak phantasy (which has a crucial role in empathy and typifying perception) and Benny Shanon’s concept of vision are precisely discernible, and, consequently, it may be possible that weak phantasy and visionary phantasy are situated on the two outermost poles of the colorful spectrum of phantasy activity.

Horváth, L., Szummer, C., & Szabo, A. (2017). Weak phantasy and visionary phantasy: the phenomenological significance of altered states of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1-13. 10.1007/s11097-016-9497-4

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Unlocking the Traumatic through the Psychedelic in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest

Abstract

This is an attempt to investigate the causal relationship existing between the psychedelic literary genre in fiction and the application of trauma theory in the study of One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest. Trauma theory, which is a psychological theory in essence; has been widely linked to the study of literature since traumatic responses take narrative forms. Scientifically, many studies have proven that the psychedelic trip leads to a deepened exploration of the unconscious tracing latent emotional traumas. Henceforth, I am going to explore this novel as a psychedelic example of science fiction through a generic analysis due to the numerous parallels I have noticed with the effects of drug administration on real life patients. I will base my claim on a medical theory known as Psychedelic Information Theory which investigates psychedelic hallucinations, expanded consciousness and their impact on the metaphysical aspects of self-exploration. Consequently, I shall presuppose that psychedelics act metaphorically on the text of One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest inducing character-based hallucinatory narratives. Hallucinations are caused by an eruption of a psychedelic consciousness that is the antithesis of the normal state of a mind. Hallucinations range from happy enjoyable experiences laden with kaleidoscopic colourful streams of visions to painful manifestations of latent trauma. I endeavour to analyze this novel as a traumatic example of psychedelic fiction through establishing a cause-result relationship between information theory and trauma theory as a fluid encounter between literature and science within science fiction framework. Finally, I attempt to link the cultural integration of psychedelics to the shift of the traumatic experience from cultural to structural. This paper explores primarily the manifestations of Chief Bromden’s historic trauma. It traces secondarily the psychedelic characteristics of the novel. Lastly, it studies the effects of Bromden’s psychedelic journey on his traumatic recovery.

Besbes, M. (2016). Unlocking the Traumatic through the Psychedelic in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest.
Link to full text

Unlocking the Traumatic through the Psychedelic in One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest

Abstract

This is an attempt to investigate the causal relationship existing between the psychedelic literary genre in fiction and the application of trauma theory in the study of One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest. Trauma theory, which is a psychological theory in essence; has been widely linked to the study of literature since traumatic responses take narrative forms. Scientifically, many studies have proven that the psychedelic trip leads to a deepened exploration of the unconscious tracing latent emotional traumas. Henceforth, I am going to explore this novel as a psychedelic example of science fiction through a generic analysis due to the numerous parallels I have noticed with the effects of drug administration on real life patients. I will base my claim on a medical theory known as Psychedelic Information Theory which investigates psychedelic hallucinations, expanded consciousness and their impact on the metaphysical aspects of self-exploration. Consequently, I shall presuppose that psychedelics act metaphorically on the text of One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest inducing character-based hallucinatory narratives. Hallucinations are caused by an eruption of a psychedelic consciousness that is the antithesis of the normal state of a mind. Hallucinations range from happy enjoyable experiences laden with kaleidoscopic colourful streams of visions to painful manifestations of latent trauma. I endeavour to analyze this novel as a traumatic example of psychedelic fiction through establishing a cause-result relationship between information theory and trauma theory as a fluid encounter between literature and science within science fiction framework. Finally, I attempt to link the cultural integration of psychedelics to the shift of the traumatic experience from cultural to structural. This paper explores primarily the manifestations of Chief Bromden’s historic trauma. It traces secondarily the psychedelic characteristics of the novel. Lastly, it studies the effects of Bromden’s psychedelic journey on his traumatic recovery.

Besbes, M. (2016). Unlocking the Traumatic through the Psychedelic in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest.
Link to full text

Psychedelics and cognitive liberty: Reimagining drug policy through the prism of human rights.

Abstract

This paper reimagines drug policy – specifically psychedelic drug policy – through the prism of human rights. Challenges to the incumbent prohibitionist paradigm that have been brought from this perspective to date – namely by calling for exemptions from criminalisation on therapeutic or religious grounds – are considered, before the assertion is made that there is a need to go beyond such reified constructs, calling for an end to psychedelic drug prohibitions on the basis of the more fundamental right to cognitive liberty. This central concept is explicated, asserted as being a crucial component of freedom of thought, as enshrined within Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is argued that the right to cognitive liberty is routinely breached by the existence of the system of drug prohibition in the United Kingdom (UK), as encoded within the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA). On this basis, it is proposed that Article 9 could be wielded to challenge the prohibitive system in the courts. This legal argument is supported by a parallel and entwined argument grounded in the political philosophy of classical liberalism: namely, that the state should only deploy the criminal law where an individual’s actions demonstrably run a high risk of causing harm to others. Beyond the courts, it is recommended that this liberal, rights-based approach also inform psychedelic drug policy activism, moving past the current predominant focus on harm reduction, towards a prioritization of benefit maximization. How this might translate in to a different regulatory model for psychedelic drugs, a third way, distinct from the traditional criminal and medical systems of control, is tentatively considered. However, given the dominant political climate in the UK – with its move away from rights and towards a more authoritarian drug policy – the possibility that it is only through underground movements that cognitive liberty will be assured in the foreseeable future is contemplated.

Walsh, C. (2016). Psychedelics and Cognitive Liberty: Reimagining drug policy through the prism of human rights. International Journal of Drug Policy. dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2015.12.025

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2 April - New Insights on Addiction & Psychedelic Healing Followed by a Live Q&A!

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